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THE DEFINITION OF BAILMENT
By CHARLES E. CULLEN.*
Recent discussions of the proper juristic conception of rights,
duties, and liabilities have brought into prominence the conflict between
two theories. One holds that they are the incidents of a relation, the
other, which has been accepted for several centuries, that they are the
results of express undertaking, voluntary wrong doing, or culpable
action. The advocates of the relationship doctrine go back to the Year
Books and in the feudal element and its contribution to the English
common law find status as the source of many of the rights and duties,
rather than the compact of individuals: "Anglo-American law is per-
vaded on every hand by the idea of relation and of legal consequences
following therefrom."' The nineteenth century deduction of law from
a metaphysical principle of individual liberty-itself a culmination of
the mental attitude beginning with the Puritan contests with the crown
-is blamed for the ill repute into which status, as an institution, fell.
The resulting strength of contract as a source of rights, duties and
liabilities in modern law is, therefore, according to the advocates of
the relationship doctrine, an unnatural and illogical development and
to support that view it is claimed "the whole course of English and
American law today is belying it, unless indeed we are progressing
backward."' To support the movement back to status we find cited
chiefly the regulation of the duties of insurance companies and public
service corporations and the workmen's compensation acts.
*Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.
1. Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law, p. 22 et seq.
2. Ibid. p. 28.
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Contrasted with the above view, it has been indicated3 that there
might not be the sharp distinction between the contract and relation-
ship ideas. This view suggests a recurrence in cycles of certain changes
which are brought about by the three instrumentalities of adjustment,
Fictions, Equity, and Legislation, originally advocated by Sir Henry
Maine in his Ancient Law, and is further elaborated in "The Schools
of Jurisprudence, Their Places in History and Their Present Align-
ment."4 Following the latter reasoning it would seem that changes
come about to cure abuses which develop when a single viewpoint,
such as that of status, produces a uniformity that is stifling individual
or group development. On the other hand, when freedom of contract
results in relations so individualized that there is no uniformity of
rights, duties, or obligations, legislation is likely to be called upon as a
standardizing agent. Such would be the statutory regulation of public
utilities, insurance, and workmen's compensation acts.
Which school of thought shall we follow in defining bailment?
Undoubtedly a large portion of bailment transactions were originally
governed by rules of status, particularly when the bailee was following
a public calling.5 The recognition of bailments as such was, however,
apparently first limited to those arising out of agreement, and Ames
has pointed out that it was because of the limitation of bailment to
relations arising out of contract that detinue was not available as a
remedy to the loser of chattels against the finder, his remedy for a re-
fusal to surrender the goods being in trespass."
It has been suggested that those relationships which are in their
natures undertakings but which are not included in tort or contract
would have formed a third grand division to include at least public
undertakings and gratuitous undertakings. "Bailments, however, were
after a struggle drawn off into the division of contracts; and a few
other cases of undertakings then known, not being of sufficient impor-
tance to form a separate division, either followed bailments, or with
other actions on the case sank back into the division of torts.",
Are we to follow the conclusions of students of jurisprudence con-
cerning the importance of status in the feudal period, and pass by the
impress made by contract during the recent centuries as illogical and
3. Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing 'of Contracts, 27 Yale Law Jour-
nal, 34 et seq.
4. 31 Harvard Law Review, 373.
5. 0. W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, Lecture 5.
6. James Barr Ames, The History of Trover, Vol. 3, Select Essays
in Anglo-American Legal History, 417.
7. Jos. H. Beale, Jr., Gratuitous Undertakings, 5 Harvard Law Re-
view, 222.
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ephemeral? Has there not come about a change so permanent that, to
satisfactorily meet the needs of practice, the modem conception afid not
the historical one must be embodied in a definition? Is it not true that
as indicated in the quotation supra, bailments passed into the field of
contract and have remained there? The difficulty of accurate definition
and the differences in opinion of what a definition should include, are
pointed out by Schouler8 and Story.' It does not seem proper to elimi-
nate from a proper definition all reference to the contractual nature
of bailments. The difficulties arise from two sources. One is the con-
fusion arising from varying ideas of consideration; the other, from the
inclusion in the bailment class of the small group of transactions em-
bracing chattels found when lost or mislaid, or deposited by natural
forces.
In the great majority of bailment transactions the contractual na-
ture of the undertaking and the presence of consideration is evident,
but in gratuitous bailments the presence of consideration is not so ap-
parent. It has been asserted that there is no consideration present in
such transactions because the party benefited surrenders no legal right.
This view is based on the conception of consideration which requires
that there be some "act or forbearance given in exchange for a prom-
ise" 10 before we can have a contract or an enforceable contractual obli-
gation. It is, accordingly, maintained that the property rights are
inherent in gratuitous bailments by reason of status or relation rather
than as attributes of contract.
We may acknowledge that much of the doctrine of consideration
had its origin in a procedural basis and that the similarity of remedy
in contract and quasi-contract during the development of assumpsit led
lawyers to believe that where assumpsit lay a contract must be found
and consideration must be present.11 Also we may acknowledge that
because of this it was easy to assimilate gratuitous undertakings, really
enforceable by quasi-contractual procedure, into the group of bailments
arising out of express or implied contract. That they were so assimi-
lated is shown by such efforts as that of Lord Holt. "But secondly, it
is objected, that there is no consideration to ground this promise upon
and, therefore, the undertaking is but a nudunt pactum. But to this I
8. James Schouler, A Treatise on the Law of Bailments (1880), p. 2.
9. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Law of Bailments (9th Edi-
tion) Sec. 1.
10. Ames, Two Theories of Consideration, 12 Harvard Law Review,
515, 1. c. 531; 13 Harvard Law Review, 36.
11. W. S. Holdsworth, Debt, Assumpsit and Consideration, It Michi-
gan Law Review, 347.
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answer, that the owner's trusting him with the goods is a sufficient
consideration to oblige him to a careful management.""2 But regardless
of how the doctrine of consideration widened, the last few centuries
have seen it accepted and adapted by bench and bar until its place is
firmly fixed. As a doctrine it is neither irrational nor illogical. "The
old definitions and tests are not wide enough to cover all cases of just
obligation arising from a promise.-The conflict of authortity on this
secondary aspect of consideration shows that legal detriment, 'as a
universal rule of thumb which may be applied blindly and mechanically
to test the sufficiency or value of consideration', has broken down." 13
Usage and practice have recognized a consideration in gratuitous
undertakings for the benefit of one or the other party as arising from
the surrender of the possession of the chattels. The obligation based
on the property right arising out of the relation and enforceable by an
action in trespass disappeared when the action of detinue sur trover
was allowed when findings were being assimilated into the bailment
class.
The rights and obligations of the loser and finder and of the owner
and involuntary depositary are recognized today as similar to those of
bailor or bailee. The obligation to return the goods or account for
their conversion or for the results of some degree of negligence exist
in these transactions. The action to enforce this obligation has been
classified with those of customary duty and enforceable by an action in
quasi-contract. 14 This is not conceding that customary duty is one
of relationship or status. It does not require an hypothesis that there
is a status of loser and finder but one of duty imposed by law on the
finder because of his own action. In Burns v. State,15 in which one
who had picked up money thrown away by an insane fugitive and had
failed to account for it, was held rightly convicted of larceny as
bailee, it is said, 1. c. 380, "the mutuality essential to the contractual
feature may be created by operation of law as well as by acts of the
parties with intent to contract. So it makes no difference whether the
thing be entrusted to a person by the owner, or another, or by some
one for the owner, or by the law to the same end. Taking possession
without present intent to appropriate raises all the contractual elements
12. Coggs v. Bernard (1907), 2 Ld. Raymond 909, 1. c. 919, 92 EXng.
Rep. R. 113.
13. Henry W. Ballantine, Is the Doctrine of Consideration Senseless
and Illogical? 11 Michigan Law Review, 424.
14. Ames, History of Assumpsit, Vol. 3, Select Essays in Anglo-
American Legal History, 293.
15. (1911) 145 Wis. 373; 128 N. W. 987; 140 Am. St. Rep. 1081.
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essential to a bailment." In Leonard v. State, 6 in which a constable
who, on arresting a person, had taken from him a sum of money and
converted it to his own use, was rightly held convicted of larceny as
bailee, it is said, "it is the universal rule that a bailment may be consti-
tuted either by express or implied contract, and it is equally a universal
rule that a bailment may arise from quasi- or constructive contracts."
This class of bailments are not true bailments, but their assimilation
into the bailment class has been accepted by lawyers and justified by
experience. They are constructive bailments.
"Confusion has been engendered by certain cases which seem to
discuss constructive bailment as if it were identical with constructive
delivery. Formerly delivery was regarded as the essence of bailment.
As this branch of the law has developed cases of constructive bailment
have been recognized covering cases where there had been no delivery,
either actual or constructive, as where one held possession of a chattel
under such circumstances that the law placed upon the person having
the possession of the chattel the obligation to deliver it to another.-In
actual bailment there must be a deliverv of the chattels to the bailee
or his agent. The delivery may be actual or constructive.-A construct-
ive bailment arises where the person having possession of a chattel
holds it under such circumstances that the law imposes upon him the
oblization of delivering it to the owner."'17
It is admitted by all that in true bailments delivery is essential.
The word bailment itself signifies delivery. ' Delivery may be actual.
constructive, or bv oneration of law. Although actusl delivery is easily
understood and is frequently concomitant with other consideration.
it may be bothersome as a question of fact. Thus the question arises
whether there has been a delivery of an automobile placed in a parking
space for which a fee was charged."' Constructive delivery is not so
easily understood until associated with the facts and usually arises
where actual delivery is inconvenient or impossible. Thus the vendor
of goods retainine, nossession which he never lost, is bailee for the
vendee :.0 one farming on shares is bailee of his landlord's share when
determined :21 a merchant is bailee of garments left on a store counter
16. (1909) 56 Tex. Cr. R. 307: 120 S. W. 183.
17. Wentworth v. Rigv-, (1913), 159 App. Div. 899; 143 N. Y. S. 955.
18. 2 Black. Comm., 451, 2
19, Galowitz v. Wagner, 203 N. Y. S. 421; contra, Ex Parte Mobile.
L. & R. Co.. 211 Ala. 525.
20. Weinstein v. Sheer (1923). 98 N. T. L. 511; 120 Atl. 679.
21. Smith v. State (1910). 7 Ga. App. 468; 67 S. E. 202.
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by a shopper while trying on other garments ;22 delivery of a key
to a warehouse is constructive delivery,23 but the control must be com-
plete.2 4 But there is no constructive delivery of papers or valuables
in a receptacle such as a will in a box ;25 nor of papers in a box given
to a hotel keeper ;26 nor of papers in a sealed envelope.2 ' The delivery
in the cases of finding of lost goods is not, like the above, actual or
constructive delivery but is a constructive bailment made such by
operation of law, the consent of the owner being absent.2 8 Such, too,
is the seizure of goods under legal process.2 9
The reciprocal of delivery, acceptance, is essential and the vendee
cannot compel the vendor to become a bailee by leaving the goods on
the vendor's premises ;30 the weighing and tagging of cotton left on a
public platform without directions is not ati acceptance;3' there is
no acceptance of money left in a pocket at a bathing house :32 nor of
an automobile left in an enclosure,3 3 nor of undisclosed valuables left
in a trunk.8 '
The finder's quasi-contractual obligation does not arise except
through his voluntary acceptance, by taking possession of the goods.
"No person can be compelled to become a depositary without his own
consent; but there are cases where a person may be subject to the
duties and liabilities of a depositary without any intention on his part
to enter into any contract, or to assume any liability in regard to the
property in question. The finder of property of a person unknown is
not bound to interfere with it. He may pass by, if he please, and has
then no responsibility in relation to it; but if he takes it into his posses-
sion, he becomes at once bound, without any actual contract and per-
22. Bunnell v. Stern (1890), 122 N. Y. 539; 25 N. E. 910; 19 Am. St.
Rep. 519.
23. King v. Jarman (1879), 35 Ark. 190. 37 Am. Rep. 11. 16.
24. Security Warehousing Co. v. Hand (1906), 206 U. S. 415.
25. Sawyer v. Old Lowell Nat. Bank (1918), 230 Mass. 342; 119 N.
E. 825.
26. Horton v. Terminal Hotel & Arcade Co. (1905), 114 Mo. App. 357,
99 S. W. 363.
27. Scollans v. E. H. Rollans & Sons (1901), 179 Mass. 346, 60 N. E.
983; 88 Am. St. Rep. 386.
28. Hoagland v. Forest Park Highlands Amusement Co. (1902), 170
Mo. 335; 70 S. W. 878; 94 Am. St. Rep. 740.
29. Blake v. Kimball (1870). 106 Mass. 115.
30. Weinstein v. Modern Silk Co., 170 N. Y. S. 529.
31. Bertig v. Norman (1911), 101 Ark. 75; 141 S. W. 201; Ann. Cas.
1913D, 943.
32. Walker v. Buffalo (1919), 106 Misc. 640; 175 N. Y. S. 274.
33. Suits v. Electric Park Amusement Co. (1923), 213 Mo. App. 275;
249 S. W. 656.
34. Michigan C. R. Co. v. Carrow (1874), 73 Ill. 348; 24 Am. Rep. 248.
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haps without any actual intention to bind himself, to the owner of the
property for its safekeeping and return.""
"The term, contract implied in law, is used, however, to denote,
not the nature of the evidence by which the claim of the plaintiff is to
be established, but the source of the obligation itself. It is a term to
cover a class of obligations where the law, though the defendant did
not intend to assume an obligation, imposes an obligation upon him,
notwithstanding the absence of intention on his part, and in many cases
in spite of his actual dissent."38
When goods are found, mislaid, or deposited by natural forces, the
rights and obligations of the loser and finder are similar to those of
bailors and bailees, because there is a bare possessory right in the chat-
tels of another under an obligation assumed by the one taking posses-
sion to return them or account for their conversion. Story called them
quasi-deposits and felt that they should be included in bailments, but
does not indicate that their inclusion changed the nature of the bail-
ment class as a whole.37 They might well be grouped together under
some such title as would cover the obligations, rights, and duties of
owners and finders of lost goods.3 8-- But since three groups, torts, con-
tracts, and undertakings, have not been recognized, we can justifiably
retain them only in contracts as they do not belong in torts.
A modern writer says, "while in the overwhelming majority of
instances the bailment relation is founded on the mutual agreement of
both the bailor and bailee, in exceptional cases bailments may exist
without such an agreement. One may become a constructive bailee in
the absence of any contract between the parties.-Many writers, in such
instances, say that the consent of the parties is implied and that there
is thus a contract.-To say that the law, under certain circum-
stances, imposes an affirmative duty upon a person does not necessarily
mean that he agrees to perform that duty. An obligation is hardly con-
tractual when imposed without the consent of the parties. It therefore
seems a perversion of language to say, in cases such as that indicated,
that a bailment is always the result of a contract."39 The same writer
defines bailment as "the relation created through the transfer of the
possession of goods or chattels, by a person called the bailor to a person
called the bailee, without a transfer of ownership, for the accomplish-
35. Costello v. Ten Eyck (1891), 86 Mich. 348; 49 N. W. 152; 24 Am.
St. Rep. 128.
36. Keener, A Treatise on the Law of Quasi-Contracts, p. 5.
37. Story, Comm. of the Law of Bailments, Sections 85, 86, 87.
38. See Beale, note 6, supra.
39. A. M. Dobie, Handbook on the Law of Bailments and Carriers,
pp. 23, 24.
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ment of a certain purpose, whereupon the goods or chattels are to be
dealt with according to the instructions of the bailor."40 This definition
stresses the relation as a result of delivery although, as indicated above,
the writer admits that "in the overwhelming majority of instances" the
relation is founded on mutual agreement."
To define bailments as a class so as to make a definition which will
convey the full modern conception, requires that consideration be given
to all the elements involved. To adjust the definition to a minor group
of transactions, the finding of lost goods and the deposit by natural
forces on another's property, is to classify a large group by the char-
acteristics of a few of its members, the latter having been assimilated
for convenience of remedy. That remedy is properly a division of con-
tract, that is, constructive or quasi-contracts."' If it is said that "quasi
ix contractu" is an expression derived from Roman law and that the
principles of Roman law have no place in a proper juristic conception
of the rights, duties, and liabilties incident to Anglo-American law,
then the contribution to modem law and particularly to the subject of
bailments rendered by Lord Holt, Sir William Jones, and Joseph Story,
which have so strongly influenced modern ideas on that subject, must
be rejected. In attempting to assemble the elements essential to a com-
prehensive definition, must we also eliminate the contributions of Lord
Mansfield and other exponents of the contractual view, and the effects
of other forces during several centuries, and return to the original
sources of legal conception, the product of a civilization and an eco-
nomic and political system long outgrown?
The doctrine of relationship as it existed during the feudal period
does not exist today. Individuality has made its impress on Anglo-
American law. The survivals of fundamental relationships in such
situations as principal and agent and master and servant, are those
which have stood the test of time and the development of civilization,
but they do not arise until there has been an agreement by which the
agent undertakes to represent the principal or the employee to labor
for another and rarely, today, to become a member of the household
group. The rights, duties, and obligations arising from the family
status and the relationship of master and servant of the feudal period,
the small manufacturer and his employees, are usually exempted from
the operation of workmen's compensation acts. The standardization
40. Ibid., p. 1.
41. Moses v. MacFerlan, 2 Burr. 1005; 97 Eng. Rep. R. 676;
Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. St. 465, 468;
Ames, History of Assumpsit, Vol. 3, Select Essays in Anglo-Amer-
ican Legal History, 259, 292.
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of the duties of an individual or corporation, devoting his capital and
services in a business affected with a public interest and the efforts
of society to place upon a business, instead of its owner or through its
management, the burden of supporting or rehabilitating those injured
in its operation and their dependents, in lieu of that burden falling
upon the public-at-large, is not comparable to the duties and obligations
of the feudal period though there may be some analogy between them.
If it is a recognition of status, it is that of a modem status and the
similarity is confined to the survivals of those features which fit in
modem life. Story,4 2 Stevens,4 3 Blackstone, 44 Jones," and Kent,. 6
included contract, express or implied, in their definition of a bailment.
Schouler4 7 omitted contract, accepting the following definition, "a de-
livery of some chattel of one party to another, to be held according to
the special purpose of the delivery, and to be returned or delivered over
when that special purpose is accomplished." He does say, however,48
"bailments for the bailor's sole benefit, are commonly founded in con-
tract and an express undertaking," and adopts Story's classification of
quasi-bailment for the finding of lost goods.49 All agree on the other
essentials, that is, delivery, involving acceptance, a bailment purpose,
and a redelivery or a delivery over. Having in mind the elements
which modem usage requires in attempting to group together under
one definition those transactions commonly recognized as included in
one class, it would appear that the finding of lost goods and involun-
tary deposits are accepted as bailments. Actions for breach of the
duties and liabilities connected therewith, are brought upon the con-
structive promise to perform. them, that is, upon constructive contract.
It is generally agreed that other bailments are based upon contract,
express or implied. The source, then, of the duties and obligations in
bailments is contractual, express, implied, or constructive. The defini-
tion of another modem writer comes closer to the accepted conception
of the profession in regard to bailments: "a bailment is a contract
relation resulting from the delivery of personal chattels by the owner,
called the bailor, to a second person, called the bailee, for a specific
purpose, upon the accomplishment of which the chattels are to be dealt
with according to the owner's direction." 50
42. Comm. on Law of Bailment, Section 1.
43. Comm., Book 2, Part 2, c. 5, p. 80.
44. 2 Black Comm., 451.
45, Bailments, p. 117.
46 2 Kent Comm., 558.
47. A Treatise on Law of Bailments, p. 1.
48. Ibid., p. 32.
49. Ibid., p. 55.
50. E. C. Goddard, Outlines of the Law of Bailments and Carriers, p. t
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